Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. A key question is therefore to understand which algorithms, or, more generally, which ...

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic techniques, which generally focus on exact and optimal solutions and are ...

We show that learning algorithms satisfying a low approximate regret property experience fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games. Our property, which simply requires that each learner has small regret compared to a (...

We show that algorithms that follow the relax-and-round paradigm translate approximation guarantees into Price of Anarchy guarantees, provided that the rounding is oblivious and the relaxation is smooth. We use this meta result to obtain simple, near-...

We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing, and where participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the dynamic environment. Price of anarchy has originally been introduced to study the ...

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results ...

The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on inferring agent values from ...

Using renewable energy in an efficient way is a key challenge facing our society. In this paper we study online mechanisms motivated by markets for such renewable energy, such as wind energy. While the aggregate demand of the large populations served by ...

Many algorithms, that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties, are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But how good are ...

We consider common-value hybrid auctions among two asymmetrically informed bidders, where the winning bidder pays his bid with some positive probability k and the losing bid otherwise. Under the assumption of discrete and affiliated signals, we give an ...

The existence of a unique equilibrium is the classic tool for ensuring predictiveness of game theory. Typical uniqueness results, however, are for Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria and do not guarantee that natural game playing dynamic converges to this ...

We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth games defined by ...

Item bidding auctions are a line of research which provides a simple and often efficient alternative to traditional combinatorial auction design - in particular, they were inspired by real world auction houses, like eBay and Sotheby's. We survey the ...

In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative ...

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for selling sponsored search advertisements. In this paper we consider the revenue of this auction at equilibrium. We prove that if agent values are drawn from identical regular ...

In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities. Motivated by this ...

Typical models of strategic interactions in computer science use simultaneous move games. However, in applications simultaneity is often hard or impossible to achieve. In this paper, we study the robustness of the Nash Equilibrium when the assumption of ...

We give several new upper and lower bounds on the worst-case severity of Braess's paradox and the price of anarchy of selfish routing with respect to the maximum latency objective. In single-commodity networks with arbitrary continuous and nondecreasing ...

We introduce a facility location problem with submodular facility cost functions, and give an O(log n) approximation algorithm for it. Then we focus on a special case of submodular costs, called hierarchical facility costs, and give a (4.237 + ϵ)-...

In many types of games, mixed Nash equilibria is not a satisfying solution concept, as mixed actions are hard to interpret. However, pure Nash equilibria, which are more natural, may not exist in many games. In this paper we explore a class of graphical ...